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A CHILD-CENTERED APPROACH TO PARENTAGE LAW
James G. Dwyer*
This symposium issue of the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal collects the
papers from the second in a set of conferences devoted to the topic of state control
over children's family relationships. In the first conference, held in spring 2002, the
organizing question was the normative one of what rights children should have against
the state when the state makes any decisions as to who will be members of a child's
legal family and as to who will be legally guaranteed an opportunity for a social
relationship with a child. Participants in that conference considered whether children
should have some legal right that constrains the state when it establishes statutory rules
for, or makes individualized decisions about, who a child's legal parents will be (i.e.,
paternity, maternity, and adoption rules and decisions), who will possess rights of
custody and visitation following divorce, when legal parent-child relationships will be
suspended or terminated because of abuse or neglect, and whether courts will require
parents to allow a child to spend time with third parties such as grandparents. The
excellent papers produced for that first conference were published in April 2003 in
Volume 11, Issue 3 of this journal.
The organizing question for this second conference was a more empirical and
topically narrower one. This conference focused on the state's selection of a child's
first legal parents at the time of birth, presupposed that the state's aim in establishing
statutory rules for parentage and in making any individualized decisions about par-
entage should be exclusively to serve the best interests of each child, and asked
participants to opine on what an ideal parentage law would look like, in light of that
aim and in light of what empirical research to date tells us about how particular
parental characteristics impact the welfare of children. Specifically, in my invitation
to participants, I asked them to
propose and explain/defend specific statutory language that they
believe would serve children's welfare better than current prevail-
ing rules for maternity and paternity. This could include particular
facts that would create a presumption in favor of certain people
becoming the legal parent of a newborn child (e.g., being the birth
mother or being married to the birth mother), that would rebut
such a presumption (e.g., being under a certain age or having com-
mitted acts of violence against the birth mother), or that would
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disqualify certain people up front (i.e., rather than making them
parents and then going through termination proceedings) from the
role of legal parent for a child (e.g., drug use, imprisonment, ter-
mination of parental status as to prior child). It could also include
factors for making a best-interests determination in individual cases
when it is appropriate to do so (e.g., availability of financial and
other resources, mental health).'
In addition, I endeavored to constrain the participants to a purely child-centered
analysis of parentage laws. I asked that "participants not [] consider at all any interests
or supposed rights of adults" and "that we not debate whether it is appropriate to focus
exclusively on the welfare of children."2 In a new book, The Relationship Rights of
Children,3 I present an extensive theoretical argument for attributing to children a
right that state decisions about their family relationships, including the crucial
decision as to who their legal parents will be after birth, be based exclusively on what
is in the children's best interests. Whether or not the participants agreed with that
normative position, I wanted them to think about what parentage laws would look
like if that were a controlling normative assumption. "The idea," I explained, "is to
see what sorts of rules people would devise if it were accepted that the well being of
newborn children is all that matters to the state's forming of initial parent-child
relationships."4 The scholars who participated in the conference relished this
challenge, finding it an intriguing intellectual exercise to imagine what a purely child-
centered set of rules for attributing legal parenthood would look like. My observation
was that it proved difficult to retain such an exclusive focus on children's interests,
rather than slipping into arguments reflecting concern for the impact on parents -
for example, concern that poor adults would disproportionately be denied an
opportunity to raise their biological offspring. Nevertheless, we succeeded in always
coming back around to the question of what would be best for the children.
A further ground rule to which I requested adherence was that participants "not
talk about what they would do to change the circumstances in which people live (e.g.,
give them all the resources and assistance they need to succeed as parents) instead of
changing the laws for creation of parent-child relationships. ' 5 It seems to me a real-
istic assumption that our society is not anytime soon going to make a substantially
greater financial commitment to alleviating poverty, eradicating substance abuse,
or otherwise lessening economic and social inequalities and disadvantages that play
Email from James Dwyer, Professor, William & Mary School of Law, to Karen
Czapanskiy, Professor, University of Maryland School of Law (Mar. 15,2005, 10:35:00 EST)
[hereinafter Symposium Invitation] (on file with author).
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a role in child abuse and neglect. If that assumption is correct, then I believe it
morally irresponsible to respond to the concern that a child born today to biological
parents who are suffering from addiction or terrible circumstances could suffer great
deprivation, if the state placed the child in a legal parent-child relationship with such
biological parents, solely by arguing that the state should fix whatever problems and
disadvantages those biological parents have. We might think the state should do that,
but the reality is that it has not done so and is not going to do so, at least not soon
enough to help a child born today. Similarly, it would be irresponsible to take no steps
to protect an adult victim of domestic violence from future harm on the grounds that
the state should eradicate the underlying social conditions that generate such violence.
Some children are being born today to biological parents who are quite unprepared to
be good social and psychological parents and caregivers, and we need to think
seriously about what we as a society owe such children at the time of birth, in terms
of whether we place them in the care of those adults, given the way those adults are,
or instead place them in a legal parent-child relationship with adults who are much
better prepared to be good parents.
And so, I challenged the conference presenters "to think about what would be
best for newborn children in today's real world if we assume there will not be a
major new commitment to public support for parents anytime soon' 6 (even though
we probably all believe there should be such a new commitment). This challenge
proved the hardest of all to meet, in my judgment, because all or nearly all of those
involved do wish that the state would do much more than it currently does to elimi-
nate the social circumstances that give rise to dysfunction and to help biological parents
who are struggling with addiction, mental illness, and other personal difficulties, and
they understandably feel great sympathy for those adults. Certainly readers should
not fault any of the contributors to this symposium for not focusing more on addi-
tional remedial programs; the ground rules for the conference asked them not to
consider that alternative. Importantly, though, there is no inconsistency or incom-
patibility between fashioning rules for conferral of parentage on purely child-centered
grounds, excluding consideration of the interests or sufferings of adults, on the one
hand, while on the other hand also advocating for a greater societal commitment to
lessening poverty, addiction, and other social ills that impact families. We can do
both, and in fact, a change in parentage laws to prevent any children from being placed
in the worst circumstances, and accordingly denying legal parent status to some
biological parents, might bring public attention to the plight of those biological parents
and trigger a greater public commitment to helping them.
In short, the papers in this symposium issue respond to a narrow, but immensely
important, legal and social question, and to varying degrees succeed in adhering to
two externally-imposed constraints - namely, that no consideration be given to the
interests of any persons other than the newborn child whose parentage must be decided,
6id.
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and that the authors focus on what is best for children born today in the real world and
not consider what new social programs might help biological parents in the future.
The results are quite interesting and could trigger stimulating debate among family law
scholars and among many other scholars and professionals whose work is connected
to this topic.
By way of background, for those unfamiliar with the various aspects of the law
that play a role in a newborn child's relational life, I will briefly explain what current
parentage laws do and what other legal rules come into play when children are born
to biological parents who appear likely to commit child abuse or neglect. Current
statutory rules for maternity, with rare exception, confer legal mother status on the
woman who gives birth to a child.7 There is no possibility of the state's denying initial
legal parent status to a birth mother on the grounds that she is unfit to be a parent.
Current statutory rules for paternity are more complex, but as a general matter they
ultimately tie legal father status to biology - that is, to being the biological father of
a child. Biological paternity is usually established either by a genetic test or by a legal
presumption of biological paternity that is based upon a man's being married to the
birth mother, formally acknowledging biological paternity, or otherwise manifesting
a belief that he is the biological father.8 Rarely is paternity decided on the basis of a
man's fitness for parenthood.9 No states provide that a man may not become a legal
parent to a child if he has certain characteristics or if he has a certain history, such as
having previously killed or seriously abused another child. Thus, one way of under-
standing the question presented in this symposium is whether states should amend
their maternity or paternity statutes to prevent some biological mothers or fathers from
becoming legal parents in the first instance to their biological offspring.
Excluding some people from legal parenthood is not so radical an idea as it might
at first seem. All states have adoption laws and regulations that exclude a substantial
number of people from becoming legal parents to children who are not their biologi-
cal offspring. Such exclusion might be based on age, 10 on a criminal history or past
findings of child maltreatment, on lack of financial resources, or on other circum-
stances or characteristics that correlate highly with poor parenting." State agencies
and courts thus regularly pass judgment on people who seek to become parents and,
in a significant percentage of cases, deny such people the opportunity to become
parents.
7 See James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children's Existing Rights in State Decision
Making About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 845, 859-60 (2003).
8 See id. at 865-81.
9 See id. at 876-77.
"0 For example, in the United States, applicants for adoption generally must be adults -
that is, at least eighteen years old. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 50/2 (LexisNexis
2005); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-345(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2006); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 102.005 (Vernon 2005). In some European countries, the minimum age is twenty-one. See
DWYER, supra note 3, at 36, 315 nn.39-40.
" Dwyer, supra note 7, at 882-83, 885-88.
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In addition, states routinely remove newborn children from the custody of bio-
logical parents with characteristics that suggest a high likelihood of abusing or neglect-
ing a child, most commonly birth mothers addicted to drugs. 2 After removal, state
agencies typically place the child in foster care and then try to secure services for the
parents that would help them eliminate the conditions that led to the need for removal
of the child.' 3 In a high percentage of cases, those efforts to rehabilitate biological
parents fail, with the result either that, after a child is returned, neglect or abuse occurs
or that the state must petition for termination of parental rights instead of transferring
a child from foster care to the custody of the biological parents. 14 Given that context,
what participants in the conference were asked to consider is whether there is some set
of cases in which children would be better off if the state decided not to confer legal
parent status on biological parents in the first place, based on ajudgment that the pros-
pects for rehabilitating those adults were very poor, and instead immediately after birth
conferred initial legal parent status on some adults who are well-prepared to be good
parents.
Also significant is that states today authorize termination of parental rights im-
mediately after a child's birth on the basis of past conduct by biological parents in
relation to another child."' The federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1996 re-
quired states, as a condition for receiving a share of certain federal funds, to give child
protection agencies the authority to petition for, and courts the authority to grant, such
immediate termination in cases where a biological parent has previously had rights
terminated as to another child, has committed certain serious criminal offenses against
another child, or has seriously abused another child. 6 What was under consideration
in this conference, therefore, was effectively whether the same result might be accom-
plished through parentage laws, which might make placement with other parents more
expeditious, and whether there should be additional factual predicates for placing
children immediately after birth into a legal parent-child relationship with adults other
than the biological parents.
In my book on children's relationship rights, in a final chapter intended to illus-
trate the potential real world implications of my theoretical arguments, I offered a
proposal for a model parentage act. 7 Some of the participants responded to that
proposal, and so it will be useful to afford some sense of it here, though I would di-
rect readers to the book itself for further details, explanation, and supporting citations
to the empirical literature. My proposal, unlike any of the iterations of the Uniform
12 Id. at 944-45; see also DWYER, supra note 3, at 255, 343 n.3.
13 Dwyer, supra note 7, at 959-61.
14 See DWYER, supra note 3, at 255-57, 343-44 nn.3-9.
" See, e.g., VA. CODE. ANN. § 16.1-283(E) (West 2001 & Supp. 2005).
16 See Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.); see also Dwyer, supra note 7, at 962.
17 See DWYER, supra note 3, at 258-63.
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Parentage Act that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws has promulgated, 8 would allow courts to deny legal parenthood in the first
instance to some biological parents on the grounds of unfitness. I structured the
model so that legal parenthood ordinarily would be automatically conferred on any
birth mother, with limited exceptions. Any biological parent, including a birth mother,
would not automatically become a legal parent, but rather would have to petition for
legal parenthood of a child, only if he or she:
1) is below eighteen years of age at the time of the child's birth;
2) at the time of the child's birth is imprisoned or has been sen-
tenced to serve a prison term following the birth;
3) has harmed the child before birth through voluntary conduct,
including but not limited to committing acts of violence to-
ward the gestational mother during pregnancy and ingesting
[specified illegal drugs or legal drugs in excessive quantities]
or [a specified quantity of alcohol] while knowing one is preg-
nant;
4) has previously been found by a state child protective agency or
court to have abused, neglected, or committed a crime against
any child;
5) has previously allowed a child to suffer substantial pain or die
by willfully failing to secure medical care when it was needed;
6) has previously been found in a civil or criminal legal pro-
ceeding to have committed acts of violence toward or sexual
offenses against any person;
7) is already a legal parent to four or more children and is receiv-
ing [specified forms of public assistance];
8) has been diagnosed with a mental illness that would, even with
treatment then being received, endanger the safety of a child in
his or her care;
9) has an IQ of less than 70.'9
Legal fatherhood automatically would be conferred, without need for a court or
administrative hearing, upon a man who is married to the birth mother, without
regard to his biological paternity, so long as the birth mother consents to his becoming
the legal father and so long as none of the things in the list above is true as applied
to him. There would be no automatic conferral of legal fatherhood in connection
8 Text of these acts can be found at the Conference's official website through the
University of Pennsylvania Law School. See Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State
Laws, Drafts of Uniform and Model Acts, http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm (last
visited Feb. 15, 2006).
19 DWYER, supra note 3, at 260.
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with a child born to an unmarried woman. Rather, any man wishing to become a
non-marital child's legal father would need to petition for parenthood. Further, under
my proposal, when a given child does not have a legal mother and father automati-
cally at the time of birth, anyone may petition to become a legal parent to the child.20
I would establish a strong presumption that a child is to have no more than two legal
parents, but allow petitioners to overcome that presumption with clear and convincing
evidence that it would be best for the child to have more than two persons recognized
as legal parents.2'
A family court would decide whether to grant any petition for legal parenthood
on purely child-centered grounds; it would make a "substituted judgment" for the
child, which would effectively amount to a best-interests determination.22 In making
that surrogate choice for the child, the court would not focus exclusively on the bio-
logical connection, but that connection would be relevant. I recommend that the court
consider all of these factors:
1) the nature and extent of any existing personal relationship be-
tween the petitioner and the child;
2) the nature and extent of any personal relationship between
the petitioner and any other petitioner or legal parent, in-
cluding any expected positive or negative impact on a child
arising from the nature of that relationship, and the likely
future duration of that relationship;
3) the age and maturity of the petitioner;
4) any interest previously shown by the petitioner in the child,
as evidenced by such behavior as providing material support
to the mother during pregnancy, securing prenatal medical
care, and preparing to care for the child after birth;
5) the attitudes of the petitioner's family members, of any co-
petitioner, or of any existing legal parent toward the child and
toward the petitioner's participation in the child's life, and
their willingness to support the parenting of the petitioner;
6) any special needs of the child;
7) the parenting abilities and knowledge of the petitioner;
8) the mental and physical health and abilities of the petitioner,
taking into account, in the case of illness or disability, treat-
ment or compensatory measures that are currently available
and that the petitioner is willing to use;
20 See id. at 259-60.
21 Id. at 262.
22 Id. at 261. For a discussion of the relationship between "substituted judgment" and
"best interests," see id. at 206-08.
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9) the living circumstances of the petitioner, including home
environment, financial resources, the petitioner's ability and
desire to spend time with the child, other personal relation-
ships of the petitioner insofar as they might enhance or inhibit
the petitioner's ability to parent, and threats to the child's wel-
fare that might exist in or around the petitioner's residence;
10) any past conduct by the petitioner that suggests a potential
for harm to the child, including but not limited to any prior
acts of violence against family members or other persons and
any prior findings of a state child protective agency or court
that the petitioner abused or neglected any child;
11) the petitioner's level of commitment to securing a good edu-
cation, health care, and positive socializing experiences for
the child;
12) any biological relationship between the petitioner and the
child;
13) the desire of other adults to serve as legal parents; and
14) any other considerations relevant to the welfare of the child.23
In offering this proposal, I did not labor under an illusion that it would be politically
viable. Nor did I assume courts would find such an approach to parentage constitu-
tional, though they might very well do so. I offered it as an illustration of what a purely
child-centered approach to state creation of legal parent-child relationships might look
like. And in this conference, participants were able, if they wished, to respond to it on
those grounds. I am very gratified that some chose to do so. In addition, several of-
fered intriguing proposals of their own that merit close consideration.
In the first symposium paper, David Meyer describes the constitutional framework
in which courts would assess the permissibility of any revisions to parentage laws.24
Professor Meyer concludes that "states enjoy considerable latitude to reorient parentage
law in a child-centered direction," while cautioning that something more than "a bare
'best interests' showing" might be required to exclude any biological parents from
parenthood, because of the continued societal consensus that procreation gives rise to
a legitimate expectation of legal parent status.25 Meyer draws an important distinction
between terminating a legal parent-child relationship after it is created and after a
social relationship and psychological bond has formed between parent and child, on
the one hand, and on the other hand denying someone the opportunity to become a
legal parent and to form a relationship, suggesting that the constitutional bar might
23 Id. at 261-62.
24 David D. Meyer, The Constitutionality of "Best Interests" Parentage, 14 WM. & MARY
BIL RTS. J. 857 (2006).
25 Id. at 858.
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be lower in the latter case.26 Significantly, past behavior by a biological parent that
most people would find condemnable, such as having seriously abused or neglected
another child or having abused drugs or alcohol during pregnancy, might be suffi-
cient grounds for denying such an opportunity, both as a matter of societal attitudes
and as a matter of constitutional doctrine.27 None of the cases in which the Supreme
Court has articulated the substantive due process rights of biological parents to be
recognized as legal parents involved biological parents with such histories.
Next, in a joint paper, Brad Wilcox and Robin Wilson present and analyze the
voluminous empirical research on the relevance of parents' marital status to child well-
being.28 Their paper informs all of the other papers and proposals. Their conclusion
that children clearly fare better when raised by married rather than single parents,
while "living in a cohabiting household is fraught with risk for children," supports
the continued privileging of married fathers over unmarried fathers in my proposal
and in that of other contributors.29 Importantly, Wilcox and Wilson conclude that
parents' marital status is more significant for a child's well-being than is a biological
connection between parent and child. 30 This, coupled with their description of the
numerous obstacles single parents face to successful parenting,3" would seem to
challenge the widespread view that the state should always confer legal parent status
on birth mothers as an initial matter, regardless of their circumstances, rather than
immediately seeking adoptive parents for children who are born to mothers in the
worst circumstances or with troubling histories. The empirical account Wilcox and
Wilson provide also supplies a factual basis for some of the distinctions the courts
have drawn in establishing the constitutional framework in which legislators craft
parentage laws, such as a preference for the unitary family of husband, wife, and
child relative to a child's relationship with a biological father who is not married to
the mother.32
In their contributions, Nancy Dowd and Karen Czapanskiy presuppose that birth
mothers will generally become legal parents automatically at birth and focus on the
question of who else will become a legal parent.33 As I do in my proposal, Dowd and
26 See id. at 879.
27 See id. at 880.
28 W. Bradford Wilcox & Robin Fretwell Wilson, Bringing Up Baby: Adoption, Marriage,
and the Best Interests of the Child, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 883 (2006).
29 See id. at 884.
30 See id. at 891-904.
31 See id. at 892-94.
32 See id. at 890-91,897-99; see also Meyer, supra note 24, at 872 (discussing Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)).
" See generally Karen Czapanskiy, To Protect and Defend: Assigning Parental Rights
When Parents Are in Poverty, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 943 (2006); Nancy E. Dowd,
Parentage at Birth: Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 909
(2006).
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Czapanskiy treat the mother-child relationship as the core relationship in a child's life
and add other parents with an eye to supporting and not disrupting that core
relationship. In my proposal, I do this by giving the birth mother a veto over auto-
matic conferral of parental status on her husband if she is married, and in the case of
non-marital births requiring anyone other than the birth mother to petition for legal
parent status to a court and directing courts to take into account the likelihood of a
petitioner's successfully co-parenting with the mother3 Similarly, Professor Dowd
would require maternal consent to paternity in some cases, while also requiring that
a man seeking legal parenthood demonstrate a commitment to nurturing the child and
to supporting the mother's parenting.3"
Professor Czapanskiy goes farther, putting the birth mother, except in excep-
tional cases, entirely in control of who a child's legal parents will be.36 She would
empower birth mothers to designate another legal parent, without court review of
whether making that person a parent would be in the child's best interests.37 She
would allow only a limited class of persons to petition for parenthood in the absence
of a maternal designation, 8 and she would authorize a court to make such a petitioner
a parent over the objection of the birth mother only in very limited circumstances. 39
A question Professor Czapanskiy' s proposal left me with is how strongly supported
is her empirical assumption that birth mothers are in the best position to choose a co-
parent. While it might be that a mother's objection to a particular other person's
becoming a parent should be respected regardless of her reasons, simply because her
objection in and of itself makes harmonious co-parenting with that person unlikely,
my concern is that many birth mothers would designate someone whose legal parent-
hood would not be in a child's best interests. As Czapanskiy notes, the children her
proposal would most affect, relative to current law, are children born to unmarried
mothers. 4° As she also notes, unmarried mothers are disproportionately poor, un-
educated, and susceptible to partner abuse." While we more often hear about men
trying to avoid attribution of paternity in order to avoid a child support obligation,
there are likely also men who would pressure a birth mother to designate them as the
father or whom a birth mother might freely choose to designate as a parent in the
hopes of cementing her relationship with him rather than because he is prepared to
be a good father. And once a man becomes a legal parent, it will not be so easy to get
rid of him if the mother ultimately wants him out of her life and out of her child's life.
As Wilson and Wilcox show, relationships between unwed mothers and their partners
34 See DWYER, supra note 3, at 259-61.
31 See Dowd, supra note 33, at 925.
36 See Czapanskiy, supra note 33, 943.
37 See id. at 945-46.
31 See id. at 946-47.
39 See id. at 947.
40 See id. at 949-50, 961.
41 See id. at 950, 953-54.
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are quite unstable, and they also entail a heightened risk of child abuse.42 Yet cur-
rent law places great obstacles in the way of terminating a legal parent-child rela-
tionship once it is created, and it does not authorize co-parents to initiate termination
proceedings.43
In the final paper of the symposium, Jane Murphy focuses on selection of mothers
and principally defends the status quo.' She opposes a weakening of the rights of
birth mothers, on the grounds that the interests of mothers and children are inter-
twined, that poor mothers often lack the personal and financial resources to negotiate
legal proceedings, and that the child welfare system operates on the basis of race- and
class-based biases.45 Her arguments for this position, however, rest entirely on expe-
rience with state removal of children from the custody of mothers after they have
become legal parents and after a parent-child relationship has formed between a birth
mother and her child. A question her paper raises, therefore, is whether any of this
experience is relevant to the question of whether certain birth mothers should become
legal parents of and form relationships with their biological offspring in the first
place. If one assumes, as Professor Murphy does, that the current state reaction to
abuse and neglect is woefully inadequate and causes a lot of harm to children because
it severs relationships and does too little to restore them,46 then should one not wish,
from a child welfare perspective, to avoid placing children in a legal relationship with
and in custody of a birth mother who is highly likely to abuse or neglect a child? Is
it not best for a child born to a mother with one of the characteristics in my first list
above to be placed in the first instance with parents who have demonstrated to an
adoption agency their preparedness to parent? Murphy notes that many children
linger in foster care after termination because there are not enough alternative parents
who wish to adopt them,47 but those are children who are less desired because they
have already been abused or neglected. The demand to adopt healthy newborns now
exceeds the number available.4
This conference was designed as a thought experiment. As noted above, the
legal rules establishing parent-child relationships developed historically principally
to serve the interests and perceived rights of adults. It is somewhat radical to pro-
pose reforming parentage laws with the sole aim of serving the lifetime well-being
of each newborn child. I selected for participation in the conference scholars who
are especially receptive to child-centered ways of thinking about family law. In
addition to those who have submitted papers for this issue, the following scholars
42 See Wilcox & Wilson, supra note 28, at 903-04.
4 See Dwyer, supra note 7, at 953-62.
See generally Jane C. Murphy, Protecting Children by Preserving Parenthood, 14
WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 969 (2006).
45 See id. at 974-75.
6 See id. at 976-79.
41 See id. at 974, 981-82.
48 DWYER, supra note 3, at 264, 346-47 n.24.
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also participated in the discussions: Professor Elizabeth Bartholet, Harvard Law
School; Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, University of Florida, Fredric G. Levin
College of Law; Dr. Susan Orr, Associate Commissioner of the Children's Bureau in
the Administration on Children, Youth and Families, United States Department of
Health and Human Services; Maurice Jones, former Commissioner of the Virginia
Department of Social Services; and Howard Davidson, Director of the ABA Center on
Children and the Law. The discussions were very fruitful.
One recurring source of resistance to reform proposals was the perception that
they would entail denying legal parenthood to some people on the basis of a pre-
diction. It seemed anomalous and improper to some participants to make such
momentous decisions on the basis of predictions about whether someone would be
a good parent or would instead abuse and neglect a child. This objection or concern,
however, rests on several false premises. One is that the law is generally averse to
making decisions about parent-child relationships based on predictions. That is not
at all true. Decisions to terminate a parent-child relationship under current law are
based not on a desire to punish parents for past abuse or neglect but rather on a
prediction that persons with a history of abusing or neglecting a child are likely to
abuse or neglect that child again in the future. Custody decisions at divorce are sup-
posed to be based not on an aim of rewarding a parent for past caregiving but rather
on a prediction of which parent is likely to be the better caregiver in the future.49
Another false premise underlying this objection is that a child-centered defense of the
status quo is not founded upon predictions. But to say that legal parenthood should
be tied to biological parenthood because biological parents are likely to be the best
parents for a child is to rest a recommendation on a prediction.
The crucial question, therefore, is not whether a reform proposal is based on pre-
dictions, but rather whether it is based on sound predictions or better predictions than
those underlying alternative recommendations. And if one focuses reforms carefully
and narrowly on those biological parents who have, through past conduct, demon-
strated a high likelihood of abusing or neglecting a child, while allowing those persons
an opportunity to show that their circumstances and inclinations have changed, then
the concern about predictions should disappear. There is a strong belief in redemption
in our culture, and in many contexts it might be appropriate to give more and more
chances to individuals who have failed in the past to live up to moral and legal expec-
tations. However, when the fate of newborn children is at stake, we need to rein in our
sympathy and our hopes for adults who have troubled pasts. We need to be realistic
and decide for children based on our best judgment about how particular persons are
likely to act as legal and social parents.
Significantly, the downside risk for children appears much worse with a pre-
diction that biological parents all will be adequate parents than with a prediction that
biological parents with the sort of characteristics or histories in my list of "red
41 See Dwyer, supra note 7, at 909-10.
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flags"50 will not be good parents, if one assumes that the alternative caregivers in the
latter case will be parents who qualified for parenthood through an adoption agency.
What was entirely missing from our discussions at the conference was any suggestion
that there would be horror stories for children resulting from denial of legal parent-
hood to some biological parents. In contrast, we have thousands of horror stories every
year that result from conferral of legal parent status on biological parents,5' a substan-
tial percentage of whom no doubt presented clear warning signs at the time of their
children's birth. If one approaches the matter of assigning children to parents from a
child-centered perspective, one must ask what is the danger for children posed by
increased state scrutiny of biological parents, and is any such danger greater than the
danger posed by the current failure to be more circumspect? If what is most important
for children is not a biological connection with their parents but rather consistent and
loving care, then it would seem that children can be harmed by a "mistaken" denial of
legal parenthood to a birth mother or father, under reform legislation of the sort I pro-
pose, only if being raised by the biological parents who were denied legal parent status
would actually have been significantly better for the child, all things considered, than
being raised by the alternative parents with whom the child was placed. While only
practice would bear this out, I believe that occurfence would be exceedingly rare.
I hope others will now join in the conversation, on the same terms that the authors
of the papers in this symposium graciously agreed to abide by. I am very grateful to
all the conference participants for helping to initiate the conversation.
0 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
5' Cf CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREAT-
MENT 2003, at xiii, xvii (2005), available at http://acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm03/cm2003.
pdf (reporting that in 2003, child protection agencies in the United States in the aggregate found
approximately 906,000 children to be victims of abuse or neglect, and approximately 1,500 of
those children died as a result of the abuse or neglect); NAT'L CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE
& NEGLECT INFO., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
FATALTIES: STATISTICS AND INTERVENTIONS 1 (2004), available at http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/
pubs/factsheets/fatality.pdf (estimating 1,400 child fatalities due to abuse and neglect in the
United States in 2002 and stating that such deaths are likely greatly underreported).
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